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LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD: 
NlKE v. KASKY RECONSIDERED 
David C. Vladeckt 
INTRODUCTION-A STORY UNTOLD 
The Supreme Court's recent dismissal, apparently on jurisdic-
tional grounds, I of the writ of certiorari it had granted to review 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky has brought into sharp focus a number of cri-
tiques of the commercial speech doctrine-some new, some long-
standing. At issue in Nike were communications Nike made to 
customers, newspaper editors, college presidents and athletic di-
rectors, and others responding to allegations that Nike had engaged 
in, or was complicit in, the mistreatment of foreign workers. Re-
spondent Marc Kasky contended that Nike's communications con-
tained significant misstatements of fact and thus were actionable 
t Associate Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Public Representation, George-
town University Law Center. In the interest of full disclosure, as an attorney with Public Citi-
zen Litigation Group, a public interest law firm, I have participated as counsel for parties on 
both sides of commercial speech cases. I represented parties opposing restraints on commercial 
speech in a number of the cases discussed in this article, including Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 
761 (1993), and was co-counsel in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985). I also submitted amici briefs in cases supporting speech restraints, including Nike, Inc. 
v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
Public Citizen Litigation Group also represented the plaintiffs in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and submitted amici 
briefs in many of the commercial speech cases discussed in this article. My former colleague 
Alan B. Morrison has recounted the history of some of these cases in his contribution to this 
symposium. See Alan B. Morrison, How We Got The Commercial Speech Doctrine: An 
Originalist's Recollections, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1189 (2004). 
I I say "apparently" because the Court's per curiam order states only that "[tJhe writ of 
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted." Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2554 (2003). Justice Ste-
vens's separate opinion explains his view that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the judg-
ment of remand entered by the California Supreme Court was not ''final'' under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257 (2000) and that neither party to the case had Article ill standing to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of a federal court. Id. at 2556-58. Justice Stevens also suggested that dismissal was war-
ranted because ''the reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitutional 
questions apply with special force to this case." Id. at 2555. 
1049 
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under California's unfair competition and false advertising laws.2 
Nike countered that, even if it had made factual misstatements, its 
communications were part of an ongoing public debate about the 
labor practices of multinational corporations generally and, for that 
reason, they were fully protected under the First Amendment. 3 A 
sharply divided California Supreme Court rejected Nike's theory,4 
but the United States Supreme Court agreed to review Nike's First 
Amendment claim. After full briefing and argument, a divided 
Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, much to the 
disappointment of Nike and its supporters who had forecast a Nike 
victory.5 
2 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (concerning unfair competition), 17500-
17594 (proscribing false advertising) (West 2000). Although Kasky's initial complaint identi-
fied a large number of contested statements, his First Amended Complaint narrowed the focus 
of the litigation to six statements by Nike that Kasky alleged to be false: (1) that Nike's "prod-
ucts are manufactured in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing 
wages and working hours," (2) that "the average line-workers in the factories are paid double 
the applicable local minimum wage," (3) that "the workers receive free meals and health care," 
(4) that Nike "guarantee[sl a living wage for all workers," (5) that ''the workers are protected 
from corporal punishment and abuse," and (6) that "working conditions in the factories are in 
compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing occupational health-and-
safety." Brief for Respondent Kasky at 3-4, Nike (No. 02-575) (citing Plaintiffs First Amended 
Complaint at 'II'll75, 79, 82(b) and 84). As Kasky explained, these allegations were based on a 
number of sources, including "studies and reports issued by human-rights groups," news reports, 
and, perhaps most importantly, an Ernst & Young "Report on Environmental and Labor Prac-
tices Audit" prepared for Nike but eventually "leaked to the public." [d. at 3. 
3 Nike characterized the question presented as follows: 
When a corporation participates in a public debate-writing letters to newspaper editors 
and to educators and publishing communications addressed to the general public on issues 
of great political, social, and economic importance-may it be subjected to liability for 
factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are 'commercial speech' because 
they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and 
thereby affect their purchasing decisions? 
Brief for the Petitioners Nike, Inc., et. al. at (i), Nike (No. 02-575). Not surprisingly, Kasky 
framed the issue quite differently: "Whether Nike' s factual representations about the conditions 
under which its products are made, as alleged in the complaint, are commercial speech subject 
to laws regulating false or misleading commercial messages." Brief for Respondent at (i), Nike 
(No. 02-575). 
4 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cerr. denied, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. 
Ct. 2554 (2003). 
5 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Nike and the Free-Speech Knot, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, 
at A16, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3972562 (stating that many expected the U.S. Supreme 
Court to overturn the California Supreme Court's holding that Nike's statements were commer-
cial speech). 
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Although Nike will not return to the Supreme Court,6 the case 
plainly piqued the Court's interest, so much so that the Court is 
likely to look for another case presenting similar issues. After all, 
the opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Jus-
tice Souter in part, cites "the importance of the difficult First 
Amendment questions raised in this case" as a reason not to reach 
the merits in the absence of a fuller factual record.7 Justice 
Breyer's dissent, joined by Justice O'Connor, notes that "the ques-
tions presented directly concern the freedom of Americans to 
speak about public matters in public debate" and suggests that, 
were the Court to review a Nike-like case in the future, he would 
urge the Court to "apply a form of heightened scrutiny to the 
speech regulations in question" under which "those regulations 
cannot survive."g Justice Kennedy also dissented from the dis-
missal, signaling that he too wanted to resolve the case on its mer-
its.9 
The business community also is anxious for another opportu-
nity to persuade the Court to dismantle the commercial speech 
doctrine or at least limit the categories of expression that fall 
within the doctrine. Of the thirty-one amicus briefs filed in Nike, 
twenty-two were from Nike's supporters, mostly corporations or 
business interests urging the Court to cut back on the scope of the 
commercial speech doctrine or to scrap the doctrine altogether. 10 
Thus, there will be no shortage of Nike-clones asking the Court to 
"Just Do It" and reconsider the commercial speech doctrine. 
6 Shortly after the case was remanded to the California Supreme Court, the parties en-
tered into a settlement, the terms of which went undisclosed, other than an acknowledgment by 
the parties that Nike had paid $1.5 million dollars, not to Mr. Kasky, but to the Fair Labor Asso-
ciation, a Washington, D.C.-based organization that monitors labor practices abroad and helps 
educate workers. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case over Firms' Free Speech, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A8; David F. Pike, Activist Lawyer Questions Nike Pact on Labor: 
Letters by Attorney Demand Whole Story, Details on Settlement, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 2003, 
at I. 
7 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2558 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
8 [d. at 2560, 2565 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
9 [d. at 2559 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
10 Among the business organizations supporting Nike were the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 
ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and forty media organiza-
tions (including ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The 
Seattle Times, and National Public Radio). Nike also had the support, among others, of the 
United States and the AFL-CIO (although its brief was nominally filed in support of neither 
party, it sought reversal of the California Supreme Court's judgment in the case). 
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I. WHY NU<E? A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
[Vol. 54:4 
On one level, the controversy surrounding Nike v. Kasky is not 
surprising. Even prior to Nike, deep fissures in the Court's com-
mercial speech doctrine had become evident, although not for the 
precise reasons raised in Nike. Eight years earlier, in 44 Liquor-
mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, II four Justices explicitly called for the 
reformulation of the doctrine in cases where the government im-
posed a categorical ban on the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion about a lawful product. '2 These Justices argued that restraints 
on truthful commercial speech that keep consumers "in the dark" 
about lawful goods and services should come before the Court 
with a burden of justification approaching, if not reaching, strict 
scrutiny review.13 Since 44 Liquormart, the Court has made it 
clear that it would be willing to revisit the doctrine should the ap-
propriate case come along. 14 
Nor is the Court's dissatisfaction with the commercial speech 
doctrine new. The Court's opening chapter of the doctrine-its 
1976 landmark decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer CouncU'5-provoked a strong dissent 
by then-Justice Rehnquist. '6 Few of the early commercial speech 
II 517 u.s. 484 (1996). 
12 [d. at 501-04 (Stevens, 1., concurring, along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.), 526-28 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
13 [d. at 503 (Stevens, J., concurring), 523 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
14 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 & n.3 
(1999) (stating that while many scholars, judges, and amici curiae have advocated the repudia-
tion of the Central Hudson test, the Court would not make such a broad pronouncement when 
the case at hand could be resolved without doing so). 
IS 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
16 [d. at 781. Justice Rehnquist challenged the Court's idea that purely commercial expres-
sion falls within the protective sphere of the First Amendment, remarking that to the extent that 
the primary purpose of the First Amendment is "to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democ-
racy," that purpose "relate[s] to public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public 
issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or an-
other kind of shampoo." [d. at 787. With considerable foresight, Justice Rehnquist predicted 
that the Court's ruling would pave the way for direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription 
drugs, and forecast, among other things, that an enterprising pharmacist might run an advertise-
ment that stated: "Don't spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal 
without delay." [d. at 788. Justice Rehnquist warned that 
[u ]nless the State can show that these advertisements are either actually untruthful or 
misleading, it presumably is not free to restrict ... commercial efforts on the part of 
those who profit from the sale of prescription drugs to put them in the widest possi-
ble circulation. But such a line simply makes no allowance whatever for ... a con-
sidered legislative judgment in most States that while prescription drugs are a neces-
sary and vital part of medical care and treatment, there are sufficient dangers attend-
ing their widespread use that they simply may not be promoted in the same manner 
as hair creams, deodorants, and toothpaste. 
[d. The FDA has decided to permit the type of advertising decried by Justice Rehnquist because 
it believes it is compelled to do so by the First Amendment. Using FDA-Approved Patient 
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cases were unanimous. I? The Court's first attempt to formulate an 
enduring legal standard to evaluate restraints on commercial 
speech-Justice Powell's 1980 opinion in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York'8-
mustered the support of only five Justices and provoked a fire-
storm of academic criticism. 19 Justice Blackmun, the author of 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, complained that "the test now 
evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent with our prior 
cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful, non-
misleading, noncoercive commercial speech.,,20 Justice Stevens, in 
Labeling in Consumer-Directed Print Advertisements, 66 Fed. Reg. 20468 (Apr. 23, 2001). The 
FDA has recently announced that it will permit food and dietary supplement manufacturers to 
make claims that their products prevent, treat, or cure diseases, even where the scientific evi-
dence supporting the claim is unreliable or inconclusive, on the theory that the First Amendment 
compels the agency to allow these claims, so long as they are accompanied by an appropriate 
disclaimer. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Food Labeling: Health Claims; Die-
tary Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 66040 (Nov. 25, 2003); see also Guidance for Industry and FDA: 
Interim Evidence-Based Ranking System for Scientific Data; Interim Procedures for Health 
Claims on the Labeling of Conventional Human Food and Human Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 41387 (July II, 2003) (providing guidelines for properly labeling food and supplements 
within regulations). 
17 Of the cases the Court decided in the first five years following Virginia State Board of 
Phannacy, only two, Lin ma rk Associations, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) and Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), were decided by a unanimous Court. Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) was five-to-four on the First Amendment question; In 
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) was seven-to-one on the First Amendment question (Justice 
Brennan did not participate); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979) was seven-to-two on the 
First Amendment question; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 
530 (1980) was seven-to-two on the First Amendment question; and Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), was eight-to-one on the First 
Amendment question. It was not until the Court's unanimous ruling in Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), that Justice Rehnquist was willing to join the Court in 
striking down a statute on commercial speech grounds. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in 
Linmark Associates, which might explain why it was unanimous. 
18 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
19 Central Hudson established the now-familiar four-part test for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on commercial speech. The test's inquiry proceeds as follows: (I) 
whether the speech concerns a lawful activity; if not, it may be suppressed outright; (2) whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances 
the asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regulation is more extensive than neces-
sary. /d. at 563-66. The Central Hudson test has been the subject of intense academic criticism. 
See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism and Collective Choice, 56 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 1317, 1374-75 (1988) (stating that the Court further complicated the commercial 
speech test in Central Hudson); Alex Kozinksi & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial 
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 631, 641-50 (1990) (stating that courts were unsure what type of 
regulation Central Hudson's four-part test permitted); Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First 
Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
632, 633-35 (1985) (noting the difficulty courts had in applying the Central Hudson commercial 
speech test); Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment 
Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL 
L. REv. 1626, 1628 (1997) (noting courts' inconsistent application and results of the test for 
commercial speech); Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial 
Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720, 730 (1982) (arguing that Central Husdon created a shifting 
rule that resulted in mere ad hoc adjudication). 
20 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackman, J., concurring). 
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his concurrence, argued that the Court's effort to formulate a 
catch-all test for commercial speech was misguided and that the 
speech at issue in Central Hudson-Central Hudson's promotion 
of "off-peak" pricing to consumers-concerned important eco-
nomic matters and thus was entitled to rigorous First Amendment 
protection.21 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued against con-
stitutionalizing speech unrelated to political or social discourse 
and accused the Court of "return[ing] to the bygone era of Lochner 
v. New York, in which it was common practice for this Court to 
strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the 
Court's own notions of the most aPEropriate means for the State to 
implement its considered policies." 2 
The chorus of criticism of the Central Hudson test only deep-
ened in 1986 with the Court's five-to-four decision in Posadas de 
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico/3 upholding 
the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican law forbidding the advertis-
ing of casino gambling to residents of Puerto Rico, but not to visi-
tors. In so ruling, the Court deferred uncritically to the judgment 
of the Puerto Rican legislature that local residents could ill afford 
to lose their hard-earned dollars at gaming tables and that casino 
gambling "would produce serious harmful effects on the health, 
safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disrup-
tion of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the 
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the 
infiltration of organized crime.,,24 The Posadas Court's unques-
tioning acceptance of the dire legislative judgment underlying the 
restraint was seen by many as an effort to wipe away the gains 
made in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson 
and return the Court to the era when it permitted commercial 
speech to be suppressed for transparently paternalistic reasons.25 
21 Id. at 579-81 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
22 Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
23 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
24 Id. at 341. 
2S One feature of Justice Rehnquist's Posadas opinion drew especially withering criticism. 
Justice Rehnquist asserted that because Puerto Rico had the power to ban casino gambling alto-
gether, it necessarily had the "lesser" power to ban casino advertising in Puerto Rico. Id. at 346. 
As Justice Rehnquist put it: 
It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to 
the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legis-
lature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity 
through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased de-
mand. 
Id. The two dissenting opinions challenged Justice Rehnquist's assertion that a ban on casino 
gambling is "less intrusive" of First Amendment rights than an outright prohibition on the activ-
ity itself and maintained that Rehnquist's "greater includes the lesser theory" threatened to 
swallow the commercial speech doctrine whole. See id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 
HeinOnline -- 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1055 2003-2004
2004] LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD 1055 
The controversy that enveloped the early commercial speech 
decisions has not abated. Since the doctrine was first announced, 
it has been subject to two related strands of criticism by those who 
believe that it affords inadequate protection to commercial expres-
sion-criticisms that formed the core of Nike's argument to the 
Court. 
The first objection goes to the standard's substance. This ar-
gument contends that the commercial speech doctrine should be 
overhauled because it gives government too powerful a weapon to 
suppress or control truthful commercial speech that it disfavors. 
This argument does not challenge government's broad authority to 
limit or even outlaw commercial speech that is false or misleading. 
Rather, this criticism is that, having recognized that commercial 
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court should 
be far more rigorous in its review of government restraints on 
truthful commercial speech, upholding only those restraints that 
are narrowly tailored to further genuinely important governmental 
interests. Many of these critics favor abandoning the commercial 
speech doctrine altogether and evaluating restraints on truthful 
commercial speech using the same strict scrutiny rules that apply 
to other content-based restraints. 26 
This line of argument has had considerable influence on the 
commercial speech doctrine's evolution. Although the commercial 
speech doctrine has not been discarded, it has changed fundamen-
tally since Central Hudson was first announced. As articulated in 
Central Hudson and applied in many of the cases that followed, 
the early commercial speech doctrine was in a real sense an inter-
mediate standard of review, with courts giving considerable defer-
ence to legislative and administrative judgments that restraints on 
speech---even truthful speech-were needed to further legitimate 
governmental interests.27 Under this approach, the Court upheld a 
359 (Stevens, 1., dissenting); see also Phillip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism 
Co.: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 
SUP. CT. REV. I, 12-15 (suggesting that Posadas may have been intended to enable the govern-
ment to restrict speech that may lead to immoral conduct); Burt Neubome, The First Amend-
ment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 29 n.78 (1989) 
(calling Posadas "unfortunate" and noting that it "comes close to endorsing information ma-
nipulation as a tool for government attempts to control behavior"). 
26 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 651-52 (arguing that speech, commer-
cial or not, should be treated as such, and only an important government interest justifies gov-
ernmental regulation); cf Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 
634-35 (1982) (arguing that the distinctions between commercial and other forms of expression 
are unjustified beyond regulation of false and misleading advertising). 
27 Three cases, Posadas, Board of Trustees v. Fox, and United States v. Edge Broadcast-
ing Co., seem to be the high-water mark in terms of the Court's deference to legislative judg-
ments. In Fox, the Court rejected the argument that the government in commercial speech cases 
had to meet a "least restrictive means" standard. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77 
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number of government-imposed restraints on commercial speech?8 
But the Court's deference was not unbounded. Restraints that 
swept too broadly or that were imposed for less-than-substantial 
reasons, such as economic protectionism (e.g., dampening compe-
tition for professional services) or paternalistic social engineering 
(e.g., keeping the public away from disfavored or "sinful" products 
like alcohol, tobacco, contraceptives, and gambling), were subject 
to invalidation?9 
That standard, however, did not endure. The first recalibra-
tion of the standard came in 1993 in Edenfield v. Fane,3D where 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a nearly unanimous Court/1 gave 
teeth to Central Hudson's third prong, namely the requirement that 
a regulation of commercial speech must directly serve a govern-
mental interest. In language not before seen in commercial speech 
cases, the Edenfield Court emphasized that it is not enough for the 
government simply to point to a substantial governmental interest; 
the government also bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
restriction furthers the interest "in a direct and material way.,,32 
The government's burden cannot be met by "mere speculation or 
conjecture.,,33 Rather, the government "must demonstrate that the 
(1989). As the Court put it: 
What our decisions require is a ''fit'' between the legislature's ends and the means 
chosen to accomplish those ends ... a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reason-
able; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope 
is "in proportion to the interest served" ... that employs not necessarily the least re-
strictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. 
Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what 
manner of regulation may best be employed. 
Id. at 480 (citations omitted). As noted earlier, in Posadas, the Court accepted without serious 
question the seemingly strained determination of the Puerto Rican legislature that permitting 
casino advertising directed at Puerto Rican residents would lead to "the disruption of moral and 
cultural patterns" and could therefore be banned. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42. And in Edge 
Broadcasting, the Court resigned itself to Congress's judgment that it was necessary to ban 
lottery broadcasting within states that do not sponsor lotteries, even where, as in Edge Broad-
casting, over ninety percent of the broadcaster's listeners resided in a state that sponsored lotter-
ies. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1993). 
28 The cases that fall into this category are Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 
(1995), Edge Broadcasting, Fox, Posadas, and Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979). 
29 See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) 
(upholding a lawyer's right to advertise his or her specialty); Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (remand-
ing to determine whether restrictions imposed by the State University of New York on commer-
cial enterprises on campus were overbroad); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) 
(holding states may not categorically prohibit lawyers from advertising for business by sending 
out truthful letters); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (partial 
invalidation of regulation of attorney advertising); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60 (1983) (invalidating regulation of contraceptive advertising); In re R.M.1., 455 U.S. 191 
(1982) (striking down regulations on advertising by lawyers). 
30 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
31 Only Justice O'Connor dissented. Id. at 778 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 767. 
33 Id. at 770. 
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harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate 
them to a material degree.,,34 Without this requirement, the Court 
stressed, "a State could with ease restrict commercial speech in the 
service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a bur-
den on commercial expression.,,35 
The next modification came in 1996 in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, which drove home the Court's skepticism about pa-
ternalistic and anti-competitive bans on truthful commercial 
speech, suggesting that they were ripe targets for invalidation.36 
Although the Court unanimously held invalid a Rhode Island law 
forbidding the advertising of the price of alcohol, the Court de-
voted fifty pages in U.S. Reports to wrangling over the correct 
standard of review. The plurality opinion drew a line between 
cases that should be addressed under Central Hudson and cases 
that should be assessed under a more demanding standard of re-
view. "When a State regulates commercial messages to protect 
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales prac-
tices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer informa-
tion, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for 
according constitutional protection to commercial speech and 
therefore justifies less than strict review.,,37 The opinion quickly 
added, however, that "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemi-
nation of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons 
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is 
far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First 
Amendment generally demands.,,38 This passage marked the first 
time at least four Justices expressed a willingness to reconsider the 
wisdom of Central Hudson in cases involving categorical bans on 
truthful speech.39 
34 Id. at 77l. 
35 Id. Since Edenfield, the Supreme Court has ruled in the government's favor only 
twice-in Edge Broadcasting, a case decided the same Term as Edenfield, and in Florida Bar, 
which split the Court 5-to-4. The only other case that might arguably fall into this category is 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), in which the Court rejected a 
compelled speech challenge by fruit producers required to pay a fee for mandatory product 
advertisements because the disputed regulations were found not to implicate free speech rights. 
36 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
37 Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, 11.). 
38 [d. This point was echoed in Justice Thomas's concurrence, which explicitly called for 
overruling Central Hudson in cases involving all-out bans on truthful speech. [d. at 518-26 
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also made the point discussed in the text, namely that 
the Court's opinions in 44 Liquormart made the Central Hudson test more demanding. As 
Justice Thomas put it, "[b]oth Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor appear to adopt a stricter, 
more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of Central Hudson than that suggested in 
some of our other opinions, one that could, as a practical matter, go a long way toward the posi-
tion I take." [d. at 524 (footnote omitted). 
39 Id. at 501-04 (Stevens, J., concurring, along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, 11.), 518, 526-
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The Court's 2001 five-to-four decision in Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly,40 which invalidated a Massachusetts regulation re-
stricting outdoor advertising of tobacco products to shield impres-
sionable minors, further altered the Central Hudson test. A major-
ity of the Justices had found that the regulations satisfied the third 
part of the Central Hudson test by directly and materially advanc-
ing Massachusetts's interest in deterring tobacco usage by mi-
nors.41 But a different majority of the Court concluded that the 
regulations were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy Cen-
tral Hudson's fourth prong because the regulations would effec-
tively ban outdoor tobacco advertising in portions of the state's 
urban areas. This holding is hard to square with the Court's earlier 
rulings that the fourth prong required only a "reasonable fit" be-
tween the regulation and the problem it sought to address and that 
significant overinclusiveness was not simply tolerated, but ex-
pected, in the regulation of commercial speech.42 
The latest step in the reformulation of the Central Hudson test 
came with the Court's most recent commercial speech decision-
its 2002 ruling in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,43 
where the Court five-to-four struck down a federal law authorizing 
pharmacists to "compound" drugs, but prohibiting pharmacists 
from advertising that service. The law had been crafted to permit 
pharmacists to compound specialty drugs needed by a handful of 
patients and not generally available in the market. But Congress 
was wary that pharmacies were not equipped to engage safely in 
the mass compounding of drugs and thus wanted to ensure that 
28 (Thomas, J., concurring). I say "at least" four Justices because Justice Scalia's concurrence 
is opaque on whether he intended to join this block of Justices in calling for the overhaul of the 
commercial speech doctrine. See id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). 44 Liquormart is also nota-
ble because it formalized the Court's rejection of the "greater includes the lesser" theory ad-
vanced by the majority in Posadas, but not followed and largely discredited thereafter. Id. at 
510-13 (rejecting the notion that a state may regulate commercial speech about a product simply 
because a state may regulate that product itself). 
40 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
41 Id. at 555-61. 
42 Id. at 561-66; cf., e.g., Aa. Bar v. Went ForIt, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633 (1995) (recogniz-
ing that in the commercial speech area some degree of over-inclusiveness is acceptable); United 
States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 432-34 (1993) (same); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 479 (1989) (emphasizing that a regulation will be set aside only when it is "substantially 
excessive, disregarding far less restrictive and more precise means"). Indeed, only two years 
earlier, in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, the Court relied on Fox to 
describe the requirement of Central Hudson's fourth prong: namely, that the government is not 
required to use the least restrictive means, but must instead demonstrate "a fit that is not neces-
sarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one 
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served." Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480). 
43 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
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pharmacy compounding was limited to special circumstances.44 In 
ruling against the FDA, the majority discounted Congress's judg-
ment that public health imperatives justified the advertising re-
striction, finding that Congress would have to find non-speech 
means to achieve its objective of limiting compounding activities 
by pharmacies.45 Taken together, Lorillard and Western States 
mark a sea change in the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence 
because, in both cases, the Court was willing to place the free 
speech rights of commercial speakers above public health interests 
deemed by the Court to be valid and significant. 
As is evident, in the span of less than two decades, the Court 
has markedly transformed the Central Hudson test without doing 
so explicitly. The Central Hudson test no longer gives deference 
to government judgments or upholds restraints on commercial 
speech as long as they are reasonable and proportionate to the in-
terests served, as it did as recently as a decade ago.46 The Central 
Hudson test the Court now employs is a demanding one-a stan-
dard so rigorous that it results in the virtually automatic invalida-
tion of laws restraining truthful commercial speech.47 I will call 
this the "modern" commercial speech doctrine. 
But even this "modern" doctrine does not strip the govern-
ment of all regulatory authority over commercial speech. While 
the modern doctrine makes it far more difficult for government to 
ban or strictly regulate commercial speech, it nonetheless retains 
three central features of the early doctrine: (1) the government may 
act to restrain but not ban truthful commercial speech where, but 
only where, there are paramount interests of public welfare hang-
ing in the balance; (2) the government's power to restrain poten-
tially misleading or deceptive speech remains substantial; and (3) 
the government may suppress outright false commercial speech.48 
There is, for the moment anyway, no constitutional protection for 
falsehoods in the realm of commercial speech. 
44 [d. at 363-66. 
4S [d. at 375-76. 
46 Fox, 492 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasizing that Central Hudson requires the government to 
show only that there is a "reasonable fit" between the regulation and the interest it is designed to 
serve). 
47 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375-76 (2002) (stating that a 
statute regulating expressive rights must directly advance a state interest); Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556-62 (2ool) (invalidating regulations promulgated by the Massachu-
setts Attorney General because, although the Court found ample evidence of problems posed by 
smokeless tobacco and cigars, the regulations were not narrowly tailored to fit the ends of the 
scheme). 
48 See Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (setting out the test for determining what commer-
cial speech may be suppressed). 
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That brings us to the second strand of the argument against 
the commercial speech doctrine, which attacks the breadth or the 
domain of the doctrine. Critics contend that the doctrine should be 
scrapped or limited because, in many cases, there is no meaningful 
way to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.49 These critics argue that the test the Court has devised for 
determining whether speech is commercial-namely, whether it 
proposes a commercial transaction-is unworkable because often 
the line between commercial speech on the one hand and artistic, 
social, and political expression on the other is at best indistinct and 
at worst illusory.5o These critics also point out that commercial 
speech conveys important information, and, for that reason, a less-
protective standard of review should not be triggered merely by 
labeling speech "commercial." In their view, a more particularized 
and probing evaluation of the informational content of the com-
munication should precede a determination of the speech's status. 
Judge Kozinksi and his law clerk Stewart Banner argued in an in-
fluential 1990 law review article that the doctrine should be dis-
carded because the definition is too easily manipulated and thus 
"gives government a powerful weapon to suppress or control 
speech by classifying it as merely commercial.,,51 
Although this suppression-by-classification criticism of the 
commercial speech doctrine played out extensively in the aca-
demic literature, it went essentially untested because most of the 
cases before the Court involved classic advertising for goods or 
services, and thus fell comfortably within the Court's commercial 
speech definition. To be sure, there were a few cases in the early 
1980s where the Court had to grapple with the definitional ques-
tion.52 But those cases rejected arguments that the commercial 
speech doctrine did not apply to communications made by corpora-
49 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 652 (suggesting that the Court should 
"abandon[] the commercial speech distinction"); Redish, supra note 26, at 634 (suggesting that 
the commercial speech doctrine be limited to "consciously false or misleading assertions about 
commercial products or services"); Steven Shriffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regu· 
lation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1222·23 
(1984) (describing the difficulty the Court has had in trying to define the various forms of 
speech). 
50 Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1222-23. 
51 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 653. 
52 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (holding that the inclusion of 
noncommercial speech in commercial speech does not automatically render protection to the 
commercial speech); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983) (noting 
that some of the informational material at issue in the case did not readily fit into the category of 
commercial speech as the Court had previously defined it but nevertheless holding the pam-
phlets were commercial speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elee. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 
U.S 557, 562-64 (1980) (noting that protection afforded commercial speech depends on the 
nature of the speech and the government's interest in regulating that speech). 
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tions about their products to consumers, even where the communi-
cations also addressed political and social matters. Over time, the 
criticism going to the breadth of the commercial speech doctrine 
died down. That is, until April 1998, when Marc Kasky sued the 
Nike Corporation for misrepresenting the facts about Nike's treat-
ment of its foreign workforce. 
II. NIKE v. KAsKY-A NEW FRONT IN THE BATILE 
OVER THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Nike v. Kasky provided corporations and others intent on ex-
panding constitutional protection for commercial speech an oppor-
tunity to open new fronts in their battle against both the substance 
and the reach of the doctrine. Until Nike, it was accepted as ortho-
doxy that false statements made in the course of a commercial 
transaction by a seller of a product or service were not entitled to 
any constitutional protection. But Nike was unwilling to concede 
that point because the communications at issue in Nike v. Kasky 
were not conventional advertisements, but were statements about 
corporate practices aimed at persuading consumers and opinion-
makers that Nike is a "good corporate citizen.,,53 Rather than argu-
ing for constitutional protection for false commercial speech, Nike 
took the high road and argued that its speech was not "commer-
cial" speech at all, but core speech about an urgent political and 
social matter.54 Thus, Nike maintained, even if some of its state-
ments were inaccurate, they were not actionable as a matter of 
fundamental constitutionallaw.55 And even if the statements were 
actionable, Nike contended, because its speech concerned matters 
of public importance, liability could be imposed only if the plain-
tiff could surmount the New York Times56 public figure standard-
that is, prove that Nike's statements were made with knowledge of 
falsity, or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.57 
Nike's first argument urged a substantial reformulation of the 
domain of the commercial speech doctrine. Stripped to its essen-
tials, Nike's contention was that "context" is all-important in as-
sessing whether speech is "commercial.,,58 Nike claimed that 
speech that might be deemed "commercial" when aimed at con-
sumers may not be so characterized if directed towards other audi-
53 Brief for the Petitioners at (i), Nike (No. 02-575). 
54 [d. at 22-30 (describing the errors of the California Supreme Court in holding that 
Nike's speech was commercial speech). 
55 [d. at 44-45. 
56 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
57 Brief for the Petitioners at 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575). 
58 [d. at 22-26. 
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ences. Relying on its context-based arguments, Nike contended 
that statements responding to charges it exploited foreign workers 
could not be categorized as commercial speech because they were 
made in press releases, letters to newspaper editors, and letters to 
athletic directors, rather than in direct-to-consumer ads promoting 
specific Nike products.59 Opinion-makers, Nike pointed out, are 
not consumers, and efforts to persuade them that Nike is a fair-
minded corporation is hardly equivalent to hawking the newest 
"Air lordans" to consumers for $100 a pair.60 Moreover, Nike ar-
gued, these statements were speech on an important political and 
social issue-the treatment of foreign workers by major multina-
tional corporations-and thus they were entitled to the virtually 
absolute protection the First Amendment gives to core speech.61 
Under Nike's theory, even if Nike's statements were inaccurate, 
the corporation could not be called on to account for them in 
court.62 The marketplace of ideas, Nike contended, would sort out 
truth and falsity, but only if spirited debate could proceed unin-
hibited by the threat of government intervention. 
As a fallback, Nike attacked the substance of the commercial 
speech test. Nike recognized a serious vulnerability in its argu-
ment. Core speech on political and social matters, even if false, 
may not, except under rare circumstances, be suppressed or regu-
lated by the govemment.63 For that reason, Nike's theory would 
apply with equal force to deliberate, calculated lies as well as un-
59 Id. Nike's context-based argument was not aided by its insistence that Kasky's case be 
decided on a motion to dismiss, which provided the Court with little background infonnation 
with which to judge the parties' context-based contentions. For his part, Kasky contended that 
the six allegedly false statements made by Nike appeared in nine separate communications, 
including "a two-page letter with Nike's logo from Nike's Director of Sports Marketing to uni-
versity presidents and directors of athletics;" postings on Nike's Web site; a press release; a "33-
page illustrated pamphlet;" a ''two-page letter with Nike's logo from Nike's PR Manager, 
Europe, to International Restructuring Education Network Europe;" fuJI-page advertisements in 
leading newspapers (including The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, and The 
San Francisco Chronicle) quoting fonner U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, who had con-
ducted an investigation for Nike on its operations abroad, that Nike was "operating morally"; 
and a "letter to the editor of The New York Times from Nike's Chainnan and Chief Executive 
Officer." Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Nike (No. 02-575). Nike's brief, on the other hand, de-
scribed the communications in tenns of press accounts, Nike press releases, letters to university 
administrators, letters to newspaper editors, and advertisements in major newspapers. Brief for 
the Petitioners at 2,9-12, Nike (No. 02-575). 
60 Brief for the Petitioners at 21, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that under the California Su-
preme Court's decision, Nike's statements about "labor conditions in its Southeast Asia facto-
ries have no more protection under the First Amendment than a supennarket flyer advertising 
Nike 'Shox' shoes for $69"). 
61 Id. at 27. 
62 Id. 
63 See. e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (reaffinning the special protec-
tion given to speech concerning public issues); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-
79 & n.19 (1964) (noting that even false statements bear some value in public debate). 
HeinOnline -- 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1063 2003-2004
2004] LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD 1063 
intentional falsehoods. Nike would thus be open to the charge that 
it was asking the Court to give corporations a "right to lie"-an 
accusation Nike understandably was anxious to avoid. But Nike 
also did not want its speech held to a negligence standard,64 be-
cause in that case Nike might face a trial that could demonstrate 
that its statements were indeed false, even if not negligently 
made.65 
Nike therefore added a second leg to its argument: it acknowl-
edged that false statements of fact made by a commercial speaker 
on a matter of political or social importance could be actionable, 
but only if the rigorous "actual malice" standards of New York 
Timei6 were met.67 According to Nike's theory, if Nike know-
64 Nike argued that the Califomia laws invoked by the plaintiff established a "strict liabil-
ity" standard by imposing liability for any misstatement of fact Nike may have made, regardless 
of "fault." Brief for the Petitioners at 3,44-45, Nike (No. 02-575). By the time the case reached 
the Supreme Court, however, the California Supreme Court had made clear that a private plain-
tiff like Kasky, who claimed no individualized harm, could not recover damages or force dis-
gorgement of profits in a case brought under the state's unfair competition and false advertising 
laws. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 725 (Cal. 2ooo). Moreover, 
Kasky's amended complaint alleged that Nike's misstatements were made intentionally and did 
not claim that liability could be imposed regardless of fault. Brief for Respondent at 6, Nike 
(No. 02-575). Nor does it appear that the California Supreme Court had ever addressed the 
question of whether the laws at issue permitted liability to be imposed without a showing of 
fault. For these reasons, it is doubtful that the Court would have adopted Nike's reading of 
California law as imposing a strict liability regime; that question is quintessentially one of Cali-
fornia law and the United States Supreme Court generally avoids pronouncements on state law 
questions in the absence of a definitive ruling on the question by a state court of last resort. Cf 
R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (194l) (stating that federal courts should not inter-
vene except when there is no means to secure a definitive ruling in the state court without con-
stitutional violations). 
63 Of course, under a "strict liability" standard, any falsehood might expose Nike to a 
judgment. But even a fault-based negligence standard was unacceptable to Nike, both because 
negligence is a question for a trier-of-fact and thus is detennined after a trial (which Nike 
wanted to avoid) and because Nike may well have negligently made false statements, as one 
might infer from the fact that Nike settled the case for $1.5 million. It is also telling that Nike 
did not invoke California's anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) 
statute, section 425.16 of the Califomia Civil Procedure Code, which applies to actions "arising 
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under 
the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue." CAL. CIV. PRoc. 
CODE § 425.16(b}(1) (West Supp. 2004). California's "anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to allow 
early dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression through costly, 
time-consuming litigation," by requiring a libel plaintiff "to demonstrate a probability of pre-
vailing on the challenged claims" prior to discovery. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 
1109, IllO (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Had Nike been confident that Kasky could not 
demonstrate that Nike's statements were false, Nike could have invoked Califomia's anti-
SLAPP law, which, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Vess, has been used by many major corpora-
tions to bring a swift and inexpensive end to such litigation. [d.; see also DuPont Merck Pharm. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
66 New York Times announced the rule that a "public official" is barred "from recovering 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 
279-80 (1964). The rule has been extended to "public figures" who are "involved in issues in 
which the public has a justified and important interest." Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
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ingly lied or recklessly made an assertion of fact that was untrue 
and an individual reasonably relied on that assertion to her detri-
ment, then such a falsehood might be actionable.68 Nike's submis-
sions provided no hint as to how such a case might arise or how a 
plaintiff would have sufficient knowledge of Nike's state of mind 
to meet the demanding pleading and proof requirements in an ac-
tual malice case. But Nike used this concession to contest any 
claim that it was seeking a license to lie to the pUblic.69 
Although no court had ever applied the New York Times test 
in a traditional commercial speech case, Nike presented a sophisti-
cated justification for giving its speech the highest degree of First 
Amendment protection. Nike argued that the commercial speech 
doctrine rendered the playing field between Nike and its critics 
uneven.70 While Nike could be held liable for misstatements of 
fact that were made in error, its critics could be sanctioned for 
making unfounded allegations about Nike only if Nike, plainly a 
"public figure," could overcome the rigorous New York Times 
standard. This asymmetry, Nike noted, would apply even though 
the statements addressed the same issue of political and social con-
cern, albeit from opposite perspectives.71 Nike argued that the 
First Amendment prohibited the government from playing favor-
ites in dispensing free speech rights, and emphasized the unfair-
ness of a legal regime that subjected participants in the same de-
bate to two wholly different standards of liability in the event they 
misstated facts relevant to their arguments.72 
130, 134 (1967). The Court, however, has construed the "public figure" category narrowly. 
See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (holding that petitioner 
was not a "public figure" merely because he was involved with a matter that drew public atten-
tion); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979) (holding that a research behavioral 
scientist was not a "public figure" because he did not occupy a special role of prominence or 
power). Large corporations generally qualify as "public figures." See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that a credit reporting 
agency was not liable where false statements were not a matter of public concern). 
67 Brief for the Petitioners at 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that some amount of error 
in speech is inevitable and protection must be given to that error). 
68 [d. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. 
71 [d. at 40-42. 
72 [d. Many of Nike's corporate amici made the same point. The brief submitted by the 
National Association of Manufacturers, for example, stated that the 
thesis of this brief is that, when a manufacturer is responding to a public attack on its 
product or the product is otherwise the focus of public debate or controversy, the 
manufacturer's statements are due the same full First Amendment protection as 
those of its critics. The reduced protections afforded to commercial speech are in-
sufficient to prevent the substantial chilling of useful speech by manufacturers that 
would, if not inhibited, infonn and enrich the public debate. 
Brief for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 2, Nike (No. 02-575); see also id. at 12 ("[Al double standard of constitutional protection 
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Not surprisingly, Kasky and his supporters saw Nike v. Kasky 
as a garden-variety commercial speech case. From their stand-
point, the issue in Nike was whether the First Amendment protects 
a company's false statements about its products made to stimulate 
sales and likely to matter greatly to some consumers in their pur-
chasing decisions.73 The answer to that question was, in their 
view, plainly, "No." Kasky and his amici dismissed Nike's con-
tention that the speech at issue was political speech intended to 
influence policy, not commercial speech, on two grounds. 
To begin with, Kasky and his supporters argued that the facts 
refuted Nike's claim that it was seeking to influence policymakers 
and not consumer purchasing decisions. They pointed out that 
many of Nike's communications were sent to present and former 
customers--college and university administrators and athletic di-
rectors-and to newspapers, at times in the form of paid adver-
tisements, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing sales.74 
As to the substance of the communications, Kasky and his 
supporters took aim at Nike's effort to draw a line between state-
ments about price, safety, and "the essential functions" of a prod-
uct that Nike admitted constituted commercial speech and state-
ments about political and social issues that Nike claimed were core 
speech. That line, Kasky argued, was wholly subjective and at 
odds with factors that actually influence consumer purchasing de-
cisions.75 For many of Nike's customers, Nike's treatment of its 
foreign labor force is as or more important than price, appearance, 
durability, or other features or characteristics of Nike's products-
would necessarily give a significant advantage to one side of a public debate, a constitutionally 
impennissible result."); see also, e.g., Brief of the Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 2, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that providing protection to only one 
side in a debate decreases the value of the debate); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioners at 16-17, Nike (No. 02-
575) (arguing against a rule that discriminates based on the speaker's identity); Brief of 
ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, and GlaxoSmithKline as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 13-14, Nike (2003) (No. 02-575) (arguing that a speaker on one side may not be 
discriminated against by government regulation). 
73 Brief for Respondent at (i), Nike (No. 02-575) (stating as the issue whether Nike's 
speech is commercial and subject to laws governing false commercial speech); see also Brief of 
Amici Curiae State of California et al. in Support of Respondent at 2, Nike (No. 02-575) (de-
scribing the complaint as alleging "that Nike engaged in a publicity campaign asserting objec-
tively verifiable false facts to mislead consumers about Nike's labor practices in order to as-
suage consumer concerns and promote the sale of Nike products"); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Public Citizen at (i), Nike (No. 02-575) (reformulating the question presented, "more properly 
stated," as "Does the First Amendment immunize a company from a lawsuit alleging that the 
company made specific false factual representations, as part of a campaign to persuade consum-
ers that its labor practices were lawful and proper, merely because those practices are also the 
subject of public controversy?"). 
74 Brief for Respondent at 3-5, 29-36, Nike (No. 02-575). 
75 [d. at 33-36. 
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a point underscored by the fact that Nike's public relations cam-
paign was an effort to reverse the tide of consumer defections 
made in protest of Nike's foreign labor practices.76 
Kasky and his amici also contended that Nike's argument was 
beside the point because Nike did not simply engage in an aca-
demic debate about the impact of globalization on developing 
countries, but had instead made specific assertions of objective and 
verifiable facts about its labor practices, and Nike could be held 
accountable if its factual assertions were false. 77 After all, Nike 
had asserted as a matter of fact that it paid workers in subcon-
tracted factories "double" the minimum wage, complied with all 
applicable worker health and safety and environmental standards, 
and provided workers with free meals and health care.78 Kasky 
and his supporters also dismissed Nike's contention that consumer 
concerns about such matters were just "moral judgments that only 
indirectly affect consumer behavior" or influence purchasing deci-
sions "only secondarily, if at all.,,79 They pointed out that many 
product attributes that could be characterized in moral or political 
terms are crucial in purchasing decisions. For example, just like 
sneaker customers who will vote with their dollars against Nike if 
they believe that Nike exploits its workers, many consumers will 
seek to buy only tuna caught in a dolphin-safe manner, or to pur-
chase only clothing bearing a union or "Made in the USA" label, 
because those labels signify respect for and compliance with labor-
friendly wage and worker-protection laws.80 Yet, Kasky argued, 
under Nike's theory, sellers could make false claims about these 
characteristics but nonetheless escape liability by characterizing 
76 /d.; see also Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United 
States Congress at 2, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575) (noting that moral concerns may be more impor-
tant than price in a wide variety of contexts). 
77 Brief for Respondent at 37-38, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that motivation for Nike's 
speech was not social issues but rather to increase sales and profits). 
78 See supra note 2. 
79 Brieffor the Petitioners at 19, 36, Nike (No. 02-575). 
80 Brief for Respondent at 37-41, 44-46, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that even though 
Nike claims the purpose of the speech was not economically motivated, some consumers rely on 
such speech to make economic decisions); Brief of Amici Curiae State of California et aI. in 
Support of Respondent at 7-9, Nike (No. 02-575) (claiming that Nike's speech on social issues is 
a tool for generating sales); Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the 
United States Congress at 2, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575) (claiming that Nike is wrong to believe 
that social concerns are less important to consumers than price); see also Enforcement Policy 
Statement on U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,767-71 (Dec. 2, 1997) (Federal Trade 
Commission policy that products bearing "Made in USA" must in fact have been made in the 
United States); Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human 
Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. 'fRANSNAT'L L. 603, 624 (2000) 
(noting that the "human rights practices" of a manufacturer are undoubtedly part of consumers' 
decisions). 
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their statements as "core" speech about matters of social and po-
litical importance.8) 
Nike v. Kasky thus presented the Court with a provocative, 
sweeping critique of the commercial speech doctrine. It is no sur-
prise that the Court thought that Nike might help clarify and make 
more coherent a doctrine that had long frustrated the Court. But 
with Nike's dismissal and settlement, that reconsideration will 
have to await another case and another day. 
III. LESSONS FROM NIKE V. KASKY 
The remainder of this Article explores the implications of the 
Court's non-ruling in Nike v. Kasky and anticipates the likely fate 
of the commercial speech doctrine once the next Nike case comes 
along. It is, of course, hazardous to base predictions on a case un-
decided. Nonetheless, among the many arguments rehearsed be-
fore the Court in Nike, three lessons clearly emerge. 
A. Lesson Number One: There Is No Credible Argument That the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine Gives Government a "Powerful 
Weapon of Suppression" 
Despite the impassioned rhetoric of Nike and other critics of 
the commercial speech doctrine, the doctrine is no longer a power-
ful weapon of suppression in the hands of government,82 if indeed 
it ever was such a weapon after the Court's declaration in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy that commercial speech is entitled to 
First Amendment protection. Certainly the statistics do not bear 
out the critics' claim. In the twenty-eight years since Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy, the Court has decided two dozen com-
mercial speech cases.83 In only five cases has the Court upheld a 
81 Brieffor Respondent at 37-41, 44-46, Nike (No. 02-575). 
82 Kozinksi & Banner, supra note 19, at 653. 
83 Of course, the exact tally depends on what is counted. The core commercial speech 
cases include the following: Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); In re 
R.M.l., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); 
ZLluderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Posadas de Pueno Rico Asso-
ciates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 
(1988); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci-
plinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); United States 
v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 
(1995); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); 44 Liquorman, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527 
U.S. 173 (1999); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Thompson v. Western 
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restraint on commercial speech, and there is reason to doubt that 
the Court today would rule the same way in at least three of those 
cases.84 The Court has not upheld a single restraint in the past 
decade.85 Although the Court retains the shell of the intermediate 
scrutiny/Central Hudson test, critics have already won the first 
battle of the commercial speech war, because the Central Hudson 
test that the Court actually applies routinely results in the invalida-
tion of restraints on truthful commercial speech.86 
As originally conceived, the commercial speech doctrine was 
an attempt by the Court to reconcile two competing interests. On 
the one hand, the Court wanted to increase the flow of accurate 
commercial information to consumers about the goods and ser-
vices they purchase. This goal of listener empowerment or auton-
omy, the Court thought, was compatible with one well-settled First 
Amendment theory-namely, that the First Amendment was in-
tended to promote the flow of information to citizens about impor-
tant matters to enable them to make better choices.87 For the ordi-
States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002). Some might add a few other decisions, including 
those addressing billboards and news racks. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 
453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (upholding city's ban on commercial billboards but striking it down 
with regard to noncommercial billboards), with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 
507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993) (invalidating ordinance that prohibited use of news racks for 
"commercial handbills" but not newspapers). Additionally, there are those cases dealing with 
claims of compelled commercial speech. Compare Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 
521 U.S. 457, 473 (1997) (finding no compelled speech violation for fruit growers forced to 
help pay for government-sponsored advertisements), with United States v. United Foods, 533 
U.S. 405,415-16 (2001) (finding compelled speech violation for mushroom growers forced to 
help pay for government-sponsored advertisements). See also Con so\. Edison Co. v. Pub. Servo 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (finding compelled speech violation for rule prohibiting 
utilities from including bill inserts discussing controversial issues). 
84 The Court upheld restraints in Ohralik, Friedman, PosadLis, Edge Broadcasting, and 
Florida Bar, and it might reach the same result were Florida Bar and Ohralik heard today. On 
the change of heart side of the ledger, it is hard to see how, in light of its more recent ruling in 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, the Court would uphold today the restraints sustained 
in Edge Broadcasting and Posadas. The Court in 44 Liquormart explicitly casts doubt on the 
validity of Posadas. And the Court's ruling in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n is at 
odds with Edge Broadcasting. It is also unlikely that the Court would reach the same result in 
Friedman, especially in light of its rulings in Ibanez, Peel, and In re R.M.l. While the Court 
might rule the same way in Ohralik and Florida Bar, even those decisions would be open to 
question. The Court in Edenfield was careful to limit Ohralik's reach to direct, in-person solici-
tation by lawyers, and the Court split five-ta-four in Florida Bar, suggesting that even that 
ruling might be subject to reconsideration. Indeed, in light of Western States, the Court might 
well require the Florida Bar to use non-speech-limiting means to ensure that lawyers do not 
disturb the privacy of recent accident victims and their families. 
85 The Court's 1994 decision in Florida Bar marked the last time that Court upheld a re-
straint on commercial speech. 
86 Even the Court acknowledges the transformation of the Central Hudson test. The Court 
explained in Western States that, although parties had questioned whether the Central Hudson 
test should apply, "there is no need in this case to break new ground. Central Hudson, as ap-
plied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision." 
Western States, 535 U.S. at 368 (citation omitted). 
87 According to the Court, because commercial speech is 
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nary person, the Court thought, finding out about low-price phar-
maceuticals might be every bit as important as learning the day's 
latest news on the most pressing social and political matters.88 
While the Court was unwilling to equate speech about commercial 
matters with core political speech, and therefore gave commercial 
speech a "subordinate" place in the First Amendment hierarchy, 
the Court was ready to break with prior precedent and afford 
commercial speech a fair measure of First Amendment protection. 
On the other hand, the Court understood that the marketplace 
had historically been rife with half-truths and falsehoods and that, 
absent strong measures, the government could not effectively po-
lice the marketplace. The' Court did not want to pull back the 
regulatory throttle too far and risk opening a Pandora's Box of 
false, misleading, and deceptive speech that might inflict more 
harm than good on consumers. As a result, the Court fashioned a 
test that gave commercial speech a measure of First Amendment 
protection, but left intact substantial governmental authority to im-
pose speech restraints-even on truthful speech-when necessary 
to serve important governmental interests. As originally con-
ceived, the Central Hudson test was a reasonable accommodation 
of those interests. It said, in essence, that the government could 
restrain commercial speech if, but only if, the government could 
show that the restraint addressed a real problem and did so in a 
reasonable way. The regulation had to be commensurate with the 
problem it was imposed to solve, but the precision that is the 
touchstone of most First Amendment regulation was not required.89 
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is 
also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system 
ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were 
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a de-
mocracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal. 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (footnotes omitted). As support for this theory, the 
Court cited ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GoVERNMENT (1948) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-270 (1964). /d. at 
765 n.19. The theory that listener autonomy is the central value advanced by protection of 
commercial speech was first set out, with considerable prescience, in Martin H. Redish, The 
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433, 441-44 (1971); see also Neuborne, supra note 25, at 16 (as-
serting that there is a certain level of tolerance even for false speech because society is skeptical 
of the government's ability to control properly the flow of ideas in speech); Robert Post, The 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1,49,53-54 (2000) (noting that 
commercial speech is protected to facilitate a free flow of ideas); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, 
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 356-57 (1991) (suggesting that 
false statements may do more to inhibit autonomy than restricting speech). 
88 Western States, 535 U.S. at 373; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. 
89 When one examines the early cases closely, the lopsided results are not surprising for at 
least two reasons, which may be related. First, with few exceptions, the early commercial 
speech cases were aimed at state laws that were designed either to stifle competition for profes-
sional services or to engage in puritanical social engineering by discouraging consumers from 
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By the mid-1990s, the Court had begun to ratchet up the stan-
dard of review considerably, and the caution that marked the 
Court's early commercial speech cases began to disappear.9o This 
doctrinal shift was not necessitated by difficult cases. Indeed, the 
shift came first in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in 
Edenfield, with only Justice O'Connor dissenting, and then in 44 
Liquormart, where the Court was unanimous as to disposition but 
splintered as to rationale. 
This turn of events raises an obvious question: Why did the 
Court focus on the standard of review in two cases where the stan-
dard had no discernable influence on the cases' outcomes? 
One possible reason is that by the mid-1990s the Court had 
engaged in an unstated, but seismic, shift in the rationale support-
ing the commercial speech doctrine. Remarkably absent from the 
early cases is any discussion of the expressive rights of the com-
mercial speaker. The speakers' rights, if any, were not part of the 
Court's calculus in deciding that commercial speech merited con-
stitutional protection.91 The Court instead focused on the rights of 
getting their hands on "sinful" products, such as alcohol, tobacco or contraceptives or wasting 
money on gambling. The Court was unwilling to sustain restraints on speech for such flimsy 
and paternalistic reasons. Second, most of these cases dealt with antiquated statutes and regula-
tions that long pre-dated Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and had been drafted at a time when 
government had free rein in economic regulation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (defening to the legislature as having the power to control speech of 
certain groups with the remedy being the power of the affected groups to exercise their right to 
vote). By and large, these restraints were not merely insensitive to First Amendment considera-
tions, they were oblivious to them. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
489-90 (1996) (pointing out that the statute's constitutionality had been upheld by the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court in S & S Liquor Mart v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 730 (R.1. 1985), where 
the Court traced the law back to 1956, if not earlier); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476,480-81 (1995) (pointing out that the statute at issue there was passed shortly after the ratifi-
cation of the Twenty-First Amendment, which took place in 1933); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 
761, 769-73 (1993) (pointing out that all but three states had abandoned regulating in-person 
solicitation of certified public accountants); see also Brief for Respondent at 16-17, Edenfield 
(No. 91-1594) (noting that the Florida Rule at issue was based on the "anti-poaching" provision 
of the 1917 Code of Professional Ethics of the American Association of Public Accountants, 
which provided that "[n]o member shall directly or indirectly solicit nor encroach upon the 
business of another member .... "). It was not until Florida Bar, Lorillard, and Western States 
that the Court began to confront modem statutes and regulations that were enacted with an eye 
towards constitutional review. 
90 Indeed, the Court itself recognized in the early commercial speech cases that it must 
"act with caution" in moving into "this as yet uncharted area." Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 
10 n.9 (1979). 
91 One striking example of this point is the Court's opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates was brought by the Arizona State Bar as an enforcement 
action against two lawyers, John R. Bates and Van O'Steen, who were alleged to have violated 
Arizona's disciplinary rules by publishing an advertisement offering to handle legal services for 
''very reasonable fees." [d. at 354. Although Bates and O'Steen were parties to the suit, the 
Court barely acknowledged their interest in the matter, or their interest in communicating in-
formation about their practice to prospective clients. All the Court wrote about their interests 
was that, "[e]ven though the speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such 
speech in certain contexts." [d. at 364. By way of contrast, the Court then emphasized that the 
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the listener/consumer and the importance of the free flow of com-
mercial information to better inform consumer choice. Listener 
autonomy-not the interests of the commercial speaker-was the 
theory driving these cases.92 Where the Court perceived a risk to 
consumers (as it did in Ohralik, Posadas and Florida Bar), it was 
willing to uphold broad speech restraints even when they sup-
pressed truthful and non-deceptive speech.93 In this vein, it is 
hardly a coincidence that the first successful commercial speech 
case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, was brought by consum-
ers interested in purchasing low-cost drugs, not pharmacists seek-
ing to engage in price advertising. Indeed, a case brought by 
pharmacists challenging on due process grounds the same Virginia 
statute at issue in Board of Pharmacy had failed only a few years 
earlier.94 
listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of com· 
mercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dia-
logue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertis-
ing, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to signifi-
cant issues of the day. And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the 
availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indis-
pensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such 
speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable de-
cisionmaking. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Neuborne, supra note 25, at 31-32 (observing that in Bates, "the 
Court explicitly recognized the hearer-centered nature of its emerging commercial speech juris-
prudence, and it ... [made] clear that, unlike traditional speaker-centered settings, commercial 
speech cannot claim free speech protection if it impedes consumer choice" (footnotes omitted)). 
92 In none of the commercial speech cases prior to Edenfield and 44 Liquormart did the 
Court advert to or otherwise invoke the seller's "right" of self-expression. This may be a reflec-
tion of the Court's apprehension about ascribing a First Amendment "right" of self-expression 
to sellers, who are mainly inanimate corporate entities-an apprehension that is played out in 
the Court's five-to-four ruling in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 (1978) 
(holding that corporations have First Amendment rights but reserving the question of whether 
those rights are coextensive with those of natural persons), replayed in Consolidated Edison Co. 
v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 530 (1980) (invalidating a rule prohibiting public 
utilities from including in their monthly bills inserts discussing controversial issues), and most 
recently revisited in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 124 S. Ct. 619, 644-45 (2003) 
(reaffIrming prior rulings upholding strict prohibition on the use of corporate monies to finance 
candidate elections). Professor Baker's contribution to this Symposium powerfully lays out the 
theoretical problems in shifting to a rationale for First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech that depends on safeguarding the expressive rights of corporate speakers. C. Edwin 
Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 
54 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 116l (2004). 
93 As the Court often repeated, the goal of the doctrine was to ensure that commercial in-
formation flows "cleanly as well as freely." See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768; In re R.M.J., 
455 U.S. 191,201 n.12 (1982); Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72. 
94 Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.O. Va. 1969) (three-judge court) 
(holding that a statutory provision forbidding advertising drug prices was valid as not intruding 
on free speech). As the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court noted, the difference in plain-
tiffs was of crucial importance to the way the lower court viewed the case (and perhaps the way 
the Supreme Court itself viewed the case): 
The District Court seized on the identity of the plaintiff-appellees as consumers as a 
feature distinguishing the present case from Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, supra. 
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By the time the Court decided Edenfield and 44 Liquormart, it 
was ready to embrace a broader justification for protecting truthful 
commercial speech. The Court's new approach is based at least in 
part on a First Amendment theory that focuses on the rights of 
self-expression of the commercial actor. This new focus can be 
seen clearly in Edenfield, where the Court held as unconstitutional 
Florida's all-out ban on in-person solicitation by certified public 
accountants, not just because the ban impeded the flow of informa-
tion to the accountant's prospective customers, but also because it 
interfered with an accountant's First Amendment right to meet 
with and discuss his services with potential clients.95 The same 
concern is evident in the Court's debate in 44 Liquormart. Al-
though the Court did not hold that Central Hudson no longer ap-
plies in that circumstance, the message delivered in 44 Liquormart 
is that broad restraints on truthful speech bear a heavy presumption 
of invalidity, not just because they deprive consumers of informa-
tion, but also because they muzzle commercial speakers who have 
a First Amendment right to convey truthful information to willing 
listeners. 
The Court's recent decisions in Lorillard and Western States 
underscore just how dramatic the shift has been. At the core of 
each case was the Court's concern for the expressive rights of the 
commercial speaker. In Lorillard, the Court was ultimately 
swayed by the argument that the Massachusetts ordinance would 
cripple the tobacco industry's ability to communicate its messages 
to adults in many urban areas of the state. In Western States, the 
Court was persuaded that if pharmacists were to be granted the 
right to engage in drug compounding, the government could not 
require them to forego advertising simply because some pharma-
cists might abuse the privilege: Nonspeech means would have to 
be used to address the objective of limiting the compounding ac-
tivities of pharmacists. In both cases, the Court gave serious con-
sideration to the speakers' rights of self-expression and found that 
they outweighed the consumer protection goals of the restraints. 
Had these cases been presented to the Court a decade earlier-
when the Central Hudson test paid deference to governmental 
judgments and looked for a "reasonable," not near-perfect, fit be-
Because the unsuccessful plaintiffs in that earlier case were pharmacists, the court 
said, "theirs was a prima facie commercial approach." ... The present plaintiffs, on 
the other hand, were asserting an interest in their own health that was ''fundamen-
tally deeper than a trade consideration." 
Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 754-55 (quoting Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. v. Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974) (three-judge court)). 
95 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 766-69. 
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tween the government's objective and the measure imposed-the 
restraints would likely have been upheld. 
This doctrinal shift may auger well for Nike and its corporate 
supporters, because Nike's core argument was based on its right of 
self-expression. Nike took every opportunity to drive home the 
point that it had an equal right to be heard in the debate over its 
treatment of foreign workers and that cases like Kasky's chilled 
Nike's ability to participate fully in that debate.96 Nike's argument 
seems to have persuaded Justice Breyer and Justice O'Connor-
two critical votes on the Court-who made it clear in their Nike 
dissent that if a Nike-like case were to return to the Court, they 
would "apply a form of heightened scrutiny to the speech regula-
tions in question" and strike them down.97 
B. Lesson Number Two: Applicability of New York Times v. Sullivan 
Protection May Be the Next Commercial Speech Battleground 
Although many of the arguments in Nike v. Kasky had been 
presented to the Court in earlier cases, Nike raised one argument 
that was entirely novel-that it was entitled to full New York Times 
protection for speech responding to charges that it mistreated its 
foreign workers. Never before had a commercial speaker argued 
to the Supreme Court that New York Times shielded it from a gov-
ernment-imposed sanction for making a false statement of fact. 
On one level, Nike's argument has appeal. No speaker, com-
mercial or otherwise, should be handcuffed in a public debate 
about a matter of undeniable social and political importance. Nor 
does it seem fair, as Nike hammered home, that opposing sides 
should be subject to different liability standards if they misstate 
96 The word "debate" has many connotations. Nike's submissions framed the question be-
fore the Court in terms of statements made "[ w ]hen a corporation participates in a public de-
bate .... " Brief for the Petitioners at (i), Nike (No. 02-575). The imagery used in Nike's briefs 
makes it appear that Nike's statements were uttered in the heat of battle, with little time for 
reflection or attention to detail. See, e.g., itt. at 39-40 (arguing that companies will be "invaria-
bly hesitant to react when called on, as Nike has been here, to make on-the-spot responses to 
accusations" if they must first ''verify all the facts" or risk being held liable). Were Nike's 
statements actually made in the heat of battle, Nike's defense might be on firmer footing, be-
cause a trier of fact would be hard pressed to find fault with a speaker who misspoke in the 
midst of a debate that demanded an immediate response. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Pfizer Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 18-24, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that the Court should 
constitutionalize a corporation's response to criticisms on matters of public importance under a 
"Right to Reply" theory). But the record in the case, although sparse, does not bear out Nike's 
characterization. At least according to the plaintiff's allegations, which were not controverted 
by Nike because the case did not proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage, Nike's statements 
were not made in the spur of the moment without an opportunity for reflection and fact-
checking. Rather, they were part of a carefully orchestrated media campaign designed to pro-
mote Nike as a labor-friendly, responsible company and to counter contrary arguments made by 
Nike's critics. Brief for Respondent at 5-6,37, Nike (No. 02-575). 
97 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2560, 2565 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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facts during the course of a public debate. The way to level the 
playing field, Nike contended, was to give all combatants the full 
constitutional protection reflected in the New York Times actual 
malice standard. By following Nike's approach, the government 
would let the marketplace of ideas sort out truth and falsity.98 
Nike's argument on this score sparked enormous interest within 
the business community and was echoed throughout the amici 
briefs filed in support of Nike.99 The argument is thus certain to 
soon be replayed in court. 
There are many reasons to doubt that courts will accept Nike's 
argument and engraft libel law concepts as a limit on the commer-
cial speech doctrine. Most problematic is that under Nike's ap-
proach, many false statements of fact made by sellers on matters 
that could even arguably touch on important social or political is-
sues would generally be beyond the reach of regulators. Accord-
ing to Nike's theory, its statements that it pays its workers double 
the minimum wage and provides them free meals and health care 
could be the subject of litigation only if a plaintiff relied on Nike's 
misstatement in purchasing a Nike product and had sufficient 
knowledge of Nike's state of mind to allege that Nike knew or 
should have known that its statements were false when they were 
made. 1OO But because Nike, not its critics, has superior access to 
the facts-a point repeatedly touted by Nike-it would be the rare 
case where a plaintiff could actually plead and prove a case against 
Nike. There is no doubt that this is why Nike argued for such a 
formidable standard. 101 
Unless the Court is willing to make a clean break from past 
precedent, it will not permit commercial speakers to escape ac-
countability for false statements when they are made even in part 
98 Brief for the Petitioners at 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575). 
99 See supra note 74. 
100 Nike discounted the idea that consumers place stock in what Nike characterized as 
"moral judgments that only indirectly affect consumer behavior" or influence purchasing deci-
sions only "secondarily, if at all," suggesting that reasonable consumers would not generally 
rely on Nike representations about its treatment of its workers in deciding to purchase a Nike 
product. Brief for the Petitioners at 19,22,36, Nike (No. 02-575). 
101 Any plaintiff, even one who had relied on Nike's statements in purchasing Nike prod-
ucts, would have a difficult time bringing a Nike-like case under an actual malice standard. 
Actual malice turns on the defendant's state of knowledge-what the defendant knew or should 
have known about a statement's accuracy. Only a plaintiff with access to the facts equal or 
superior to that of the defendant is typically in a position to make these allegations. A libel 
plaintiff is likely to be in that position because of her superior knowledge of the facts, but not a 
false advertising plaintiff like Marc Kasky, a point recognized by Nike's supporters. See Brief 
for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at II, 
Nike (No. 02-575) ("[B]ecause of its special incentives and resources, the manufacturer or pro-
ducer will possess knowledge about the qualities of its products that no other participant in the 
debate is in a position to provide."). 
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to influence consumer purchasing decisions. The Court has long 
recognized that "there is no constitutional value in false statements 
of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially 
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' 
debate on public issues.,,102 
This general point takes on special force where commercial 
speech is concerned. Commercial speech warrants protection only 
where it enables consumers to make "intelligent and well in-
formed" decisions lO3-a value subverted by false information. For 
this reason, the one thread that ties together all of the Court's 
commercial speech cases, from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
to the Court's most recent decision in Western States, is the 
Court's hostility to false commercial speech. As Justice Stewart 
put it in his concurring opinion, "the elimination of false and de-
ceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial price 
and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protec-
tion-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable informa-
tion relevant to public and private decisionmaking."I04 "[L]eeway 
for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in 
other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.,,105 Al-
though the Court has expressed misgivings about the Central Hud-
son test with regard to restraints on truthful commercial speech, it 
has never expressed any interest in providing a greater shield to 
safeguard false or misleading commercial speech. Thus, to the 
extent that Nike's New York Times argument is seen as a way for 
commercial speakers to avoid accountability for making false or 
misleading statements of fact, that argument is unlikely to fare 
well in the Court. 
102 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964»; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942) ("[Falsehoods] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality."). 
103 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976) ("Purely factual matter of public interest may claim [First Amendment] protec-
tion."). 
104 [d. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
105 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). Similar statements abound in the Court's 
cases. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (''The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an immediate hannful impact on 
commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control 
falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of most 
other speech."); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (false and 
misleading speech "is not protected by the First Amendment"); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (''The First Amendment's concern for com-
mercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can 
be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately 
inform the public about lawful activity." (citation omitted». 
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Moreover, when examined closely, Nike's justifications for 
extending New York Times protection to its speech fall apart. Con-
trary to Nike's suggestion, the New York Times standard was not 
intended to level the playing field between powerful institutions 
and their critics, let alone to equalize the liability standards be-
tween the powerful and everyone else. Indeed, Nike's argument 
stands the rationale for New York Times on its head. The Court 
forged the New York Times standard to empower ordinary mem-
bers of the public, who do not have ready access to the press or 
deep pockets to gain access to the media, to engage and criticize 
public officials, public figures, and powerful institutions, like the 
Nike Corporation. The Court assumed that the rich and powerful 
have ample means to make sure their voices are heard. 106 But the 
First Amendment was not intended to be the exclusive preserve of 
the rich and powerful. For ordinary individuals and small, thinly 
capitalized organizations, the Court thought, the threat of ruinous 
libel litigation and possibly a bankrupting judgment would silence 
all but the most resolute critics, since even a single misstatement 
of fact might bring disaster. 107 The New York Times standard was 
developed to protect the otherwise disenfranchised so that they 
could be full participants in the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate that lies at the heart of the First Amendment. 108 
Nike's theory destabilizes the equilibrium brought about by New 
York Times and cuts New York Times loose from its moorings by 
transforming it from a shield for the "little guy" to enable him to 
criticize the powerful into a shield for the powerful, all in the name 
of equality. 
Nor are the concerns that animated the Court in New York 
Times present in the commercial speech context. New York Times 
was prompted, at least in part, by the recognition that "erroneous 
statement[s] of fact" are "inevitable in free debate" over political 
and social matters. 109 But misstatements of fact are hardly inevita-
ble when a corporation is making factual representations about its 
own products and the conditions under which they are made. Nike 
"knows more ... than anyone else" about whether its products are 
106 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 ("Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly 
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic op-
portunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."). 
107 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279 ("[W]ould-be critics ... may be deterred from voicing their 
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of 
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so."). 
108 See id. at 269-70 (noting that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people" 
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957»). 
109 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
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manufactured in compliance with wage and hour and health and 
safety laws; its statements on those matters should be "easily veri-
fiable."Ilo The corollary to this point is that Nike is also in the best 
position to judge the limits of its speakers' knowledge about 
Nike's global operations and to act accordingly, either by refrain-
ing from speaking when Nike does not have possession of the 
relevant facts or by stating whatever qualifications are needed to 
ensure accuracy. It is hardly unreasonable to hold Nike to a high 
standard of accuracy when it is making statements about facts 
uniquely within its possession. 
For another thing, Nike is neither the defenseless victim it 
portrays itself to be, nor is the playing field as uneven as Nike 
suggests. Not only does Nike, a company worth $20 billion, III 
have ample resources to ensure that its voice is heard, but Nike 
also has powerful weapons at its disposal should one of its critics 
make a false statement about Nike or its products that injures Nike. 
California, like every other state, permits corporations to bring ac-
tions for defamation and product disparagement. 112 Whether Nike 
or any other corporation needs to prove actual malice or simple 
negligence depends not on the status of its critics, but on whether 
the corporation is a "public figure" and whether the statements are 
of "public concern.,,1l3 But even if a corporation is held to the 
highest standards, the threat of protracted litigation by a giant like 
Nike strikes fear in the heart of everyone of Nike's potential crit-
110 Va. State Bd. of Phannacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771-
72 n.24 (1976). Justice Stewart made the same point in his concurrence: 
The principles recognized in the libel decisions suggest that the government may 
take broader action to protect the public from injury produced by false or deceptive 
price or product advertising than from hann caused by defamation. In contrast to the 
press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy and some-
times conflicting sources under the pressure of publication deadlines, the commer-
cial advertiser generally knows the product or service he seeks to sell and is in a po-
sition to verify the accuracy of his factual representations before he disseminates 
them. The advertiser's access to the truth about his product ... substantially elimi-
nates any danger that governmental regulation ... will chill accurate and nondecep-
tive commercial expression. There is, therefore, little need to sanction some false-
hood in order to protect speech that matters. 
[d. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
III See Yahoo/Finance, Quotes & Info, Nike Inc. (NKE) http://finance.yahoo.coml 
q?s=NKE&d=t (last visited Apr. 2, 20(4) (reporting that Nike has a market value of over $20 
billion). 
112 See, e.g., Suzuki Motors Corp. v. Consumers Union, 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (al-
lowing Suzuki to file an action alleging that Consumers Union's ongoing publication of a nega-
tive Samurai rating constituted product disparagement), panel opinion reinstated, 330 F.3d 1127 
(9th Cir. 2003), cen. denied, 124 S. Ct. 468 (2003). 
113 See Genz, 418 U.S. at 346-48 (setting out test for the imposition of liability in private-
figure defamation actions against the press for publishing matters of "public or general inter-
est"); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (setting out actual malice test). 
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ics/defendants."4 Any misstep may well mean the death knell for 
the organization. 115 Corporate defamation and product disparage-
ment cases carry the threat of protracted discoveryl16 and often 
cannot be resolved on motions for summary judgment.117 Public 
interest groups facing libel actions well understand that taking a 
case to trial can exhaust the organization's resources and that an 
adverse ruling can threaten its existence. The same obviously can-
not be said of Nike. 118 
114 Even the most highly respected and powerful corporate critics are vulnerable to exis-
tence-threatening libel litigation. Consider Suzuki Motors Corp., where the Ninth Circuit re-
versed a grant of summary judgment to Consumers Union and remanded the case for a full trial 
on Suzuki's claim that a Consumers Report article on the rollover propensity of the Suzuki 
Samurai was libelous. Judge Kozinski pointed out in his dissent from the denial of rehearing en 
banc that by September 1999, while the case was still pending in the district court: 
Consumers Union ... reportedly spent more than $10 million defending its ratings, 
while its two adversaries had spent more than $25 million. See John O'Dell, Bruis-
ing Tests Await Consumer Reports in Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at AI. And 
these are just two of the many lawsuits CU has had to contend with-about a dozen 
published cases (and who knows how many unpublished ones) involving disgruntled 
CU reviewees seeking revenge through the courts. Good for lawyers, but not so 
good for free expression. 
Suzuki Motors Corp., 330 F.3d at 1115 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This is not the first time that 
Consumers Union has been faced with potentially ruinous product disparagement litigation. 
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (regarding Consumers Union's 
evaluation and disparaging review of the BOSE 90 I sound system). 
liS See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 125 F.R.D. 185 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (orderforcing Christic Insti-
tute, a human rights organization, into bankruptcy because it was unable to pay $1 million sanc-
tion for participating in lawsuit found to be factually unsupported under Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
116 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979) (permitting discovery into the defen-
dant's state of mind in libel action governed by New York Times). 
117 See, e.g., Suzuki Motors Corp., 330 F.3d at 1132 (ruling that the evidence raised genu-
ine issues of material fact); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 
(1991) (holding that the evidence presented a question for the jury). 
118 Given the depth of Nike's pockets, it is fair to ask whether Nike's principal concern 
was, as it claimed, the possibility of facing a speech-chilling, substantial money judgrnent-
which was remote by the time the case reached the Supreme Court-or having the truth about 
its labor practices determined publicly in court. This point is important because many public 
interest organizations have faced survival-threatening libel litigation but have not engaged in the 
extensive self-censorship Nike claims flowed directly from the mere pendency of Nike v. Kasky. 
Certainly Consumers Union has not altered the editorial content of Consumers Reports because 
of the Suzuki litigation. Nor did the Natural Resources Defense Council close up shop after it 
faced a multi-million dollar libel and product disparagement action by the apple industry in the 
wake of its efforts to get the pesticide Alar off the market. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. 
SUpp. 941 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (granting NRDC summary judgment). In the wake of the defense 
victory in the Alar litigation, many states passed what are referred to as "Veggie" libel laws to 
make it easier for corporate plaintiffs in product disparagement cases to prevail. See Timur 
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 
749 n.230 (1999) (collecting state statutes). Oprah Winfrey, the talk show hostess, was sued by 
cattle producers relying in part on the Texas False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products 
Act after she hosted a show to discuss the risks of "Mad Cow" disease. Engler v. Winfrey, 201 
F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding jury verdict in favor of defendants). Environmentalists in 
West Virginia faced a massive libel action brought by coal companies unhappy with their efforts 
to restrict mining activities. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that alleging 
that petitioning activity is malicious will not always give rise to a cause of action). And libel 
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Nike's New York Times argument also drew heavy fire from 
Kasky and his amici on the ground that it would call into question 
the constitutionality of state and federal consumer deception laws, 
none of which embodies New York Times's heightened standard of 
proof. For instance, the amici brief filed on behalf of California 
and seventeen other states pointed out that 
California, along with 43 other states and the District of Co-
lumbia has adopted a ... false advertising statute that prohib-
its any person from disseminating untrue or misleading state-
ments which the person knows, or by the exercise of reason-
able care should know, to be untrue or misleading, with the 
intent to dispose of property or services.1I9 
These statutes would presumptively be unconstitutional at least 
when applied to speech like Nike's as they permit the imposition 
of fines and other sanctions on the basis of a showing that would 
fall well short of that required by New York Times. The same is 
true of federal laws proscribing false or deceptive commercial 
speech. As the Solicitor General acknowledged in his amicus brief 
supporting Nike,120 "[n]either the FTC Act, nor the postal statute, 
nor the Lanham Act, requires, as a precondition to relief, a demon-
stration that the defendant had an intent to deceive.,,121 Thus, a 
ruling in Nike's favor on this point would call into question the 
actions by land developers against critics of development are legion. See, e.g., Westfield Part· 
ners v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. lll. 1990) (dismissing action and collecting cases); Pr0-
tect Our Mountain Env't v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (upholding dismissal of $40 
million action by developer against local environmental group); see also Sierra Club v. Butz, 
349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissing $1 million counterclaim by logging company 
against the Sierra Club in an action to restrict timber cutting activities in Northern California). 
One of the earliest cases was Manin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, Co., 417 F. 
Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976) (dismissing a libel action brought against a newspaper, a small, pro-
gressive news service, and its reporter, for reporting that a defense contractor had held a "stag 
party," and paid for prostitutes, to entertain Defense Department officials). 
119 Brief of Amici Curiae State of California et al. in Support of Respondent at 22, Nike 
(No. 02-575) (citing, inter alia, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2000». 
120 Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike (No. 02-575). 
The Solicitor General supported reversal of the judgment below on the limited ground that Mr. 
Kasky had no standing to bring an action implicating First Amendment rights because he did not 
allege that he personally had been injured by Nike's false statements. ld. at 9-15. The Solicitor 
General did not support Nike on the substantive issues in the case, which he urged the Court to 
avoid. ld. at 24-30. 
1211d. at 16 n.7 (citations omitted). The provisions the Solicitor General referred to are 15 
U.S.c. §§ 45(a), 52 (2000) (empowering the FTC to take action against unfair methods of com-
petition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, including the dissemination of false advertising); 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (empowering 
the Postal Service to proceed against false and fraudulent schemes that use the mail); 15 U.S.c. 
§ 1125(a)(I)(B) (2000) (providing for a civil action against any person who "in commercial 
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services or commercial activities"). 
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constitutionality of the federal government's comprehensive 
scheme for regulating and deterring false, deceptive, and mislead-
ing advertising. 122 There is no reason to believe that the Court 
would be willing to take such a far-reaching step that would jeop-
ardize long-standing state and federal enforcement authority. 123 
C. Lesson Number Three: The Court Will Not Redefine the 
Domain of Commercial Speech Along the Lines 
Proposed by Nike and Its Allies 
Nike's arguments about the breadth or domain of commercial 
speech will at some point have to be revisited by the Court, if only 
to clear up the confusion sown by the Nike litigation. After all, the 
heart of Nike's argument was that its statements about its treat-
ment of its workforce fell outside of the boundaries of "commer-
cial speech" and therefore deserved to be treated as core speech 
under the First Amendment. As is true in most cases as celebrated 
and contentious as Nike v. Kasky, Nike had a fair point-context 
122 See also Brief of Domini Social Investments LLC et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 27, Nike (No. 02-575) (contending that the Court's acceptance of Nike's New 
York Times argument "would ... render unconstitutional various sections of the Securities Act, 
the Exchange Act and SEC rules"). 
123 Some participants in the Symposium stake out a middle-ground position, at least for 
private plaintiff cases like Nike v. Kasky. They recognize that ''the 'malice' standard offers too 
much protection to false statements of fact for speech such as is at issue here, and thus threatens 
to shortchange the interest in consumer protection." James Weinstein, Speech Categorization 
and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism; Lessonsfrom Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. 
1. REV. 1091, 1138-40 (2004). In their view, "a more limited First Amendment immunity akin 
to that provided under Gertz v. Welch seems in order. Under this standard, a plaintiff cannot 
recover in a defamation action unless he can show that the defendant was at least negligent in 
making the untrue statements, and, in addition, can prove that he was actually damaged by these 
statements .... " /d. at 1139; see also Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have 
Been . .. ,54 CASE W. RES. 1. REv. 1259 (2004). Presumably, this approach would leave intact 
the government's ability to restrain and punish false or deceptive commercial speech without a 
showing of fault and to impose fines without a showing of actual damages. This attempt at an 
accommodation, perhaps laudable from a doctrinal standpoint, raises a set of practical problems. 
For one thing, it would construct a peculiar First Amendment rule--one that gives the govern-
ment a greater right to suppress or punish false speech than an individual has in private litiga-
tion. For another, applying the Gertz standard might result in precisely the kind of shortchang-
ing the interest in consumer protection the author fears. Consider a variant on Nike v. Kasky, 
where the plaintiff bought Nike sneakers because of Nike's progressive labor practices and 
threw the sneakers away as soon as she learned the "truth" about Nike's treatment of workers. 
Under Gertz, even if the plaintiff wins, she is unlikely to recover anything more than the $75 or 
so she spent on the sneakers. Gertz not only rules out presumed and punitive damages, but 
limits recovery to injuries to "reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, 
and mental anguish and suffering"-injuries that may be compensable for a libel plaintiff, but 
are unlikely to be compensable for a false advertising plaintiff. Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323,350 (1974). And if proof of detrimental reliance is required, as one would suppose 
under Gertz, does that eliminate the possibility of class cases? If so, then, as a practical matter, 
there is little difference for prospective plaintiffs between New York Times and Gertz, because, 
in either event, the cases would be too hard to prove and the recoveries too modest to justify 
litigation. 
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should matter in assessing the application of the commercial 
speech doctrine. A letter to the editor should not necessarily be 
judged under the same standard as a direct-to-consumer advertise-
ment on television, and matters of constitutional importance 
should not be resolved by resort to mere labels. 
In response to these arguments, the Court is likely to reaffirm 
that context must be taken into account when determining whether 
speech is "commercial." Lost in the firestorm over Nike v. Kasky, 
however, is the fact that the Court's long-standing test for com-
mercial speech is context-sensitive and sufficiently flexible to an-
swer many of Nike's context-dependent arguments. 124 An admoni-
tion by the Court will add clarity to this area of law. 125 
But it is highly unlikely that the Court will reformulate the 
definition of commercial speech along the lines proposed by Nike 
and its allies. Make no mistake, Nike asked the Court to overhaul 
substantially the line that it has historically applied to differentiate 
commercial speech from other forms of protected expression. 
Nike's argument broadly contends that speech is not "commercial" 
124 Although the Court's test for commercial speech is generally summarized as speech 
which "propose[s] a commercial transaction," see, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 
(1993), the Court elaborated a more nuanced test in Bolger. There, the Court identified three 
characteristics that distinguish commercial from non-commercial speech: (I) whether the com-
munication is aimed at the speaker's customers; (2) whether the speech contains a promotional 
message about the speaker's product; and (3) whether the speech is aimed at persuading con-
sumers to buy the speaker's product. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 
(1983). Under this test, context plainly matters. A letter to the editor that discussed Nike's 
labor practices generally might not qualify as commercial speech while a direct-to-consumer 
advertisement about Nike's newest sneaker plainly would. Applying these factors, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found that the Nike st.atements at issue in this case constituted commercial 
speech, and thus, if false, could form the basis of Mr. Kasky's claims under California's false 
advertising and unfair competition laws. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256-60 (Cal. 2002), 
cert. dismissed, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003). 
125 The Court has long recognized that the line between commercial and noncommercial 
speech is not a bright one. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
637 (1985) ("precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed commercial 
speech" often hard to discern); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,438 n.32 (1978) (line "will not al-
ways be easy to draw"); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 
68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 461 (1980) ("[I]t is not easy to define commercial speech or distinguish it 
from noncommercial speech for first amendment purposes. But the task does not seem impossi-
ble."). The problem of line-drawing is not unique to commercial speech; indeed, it permeates 
First Amendment jurisprudence, which carves out domains based on categories-obscenity, 
fighting words, public forum, and so forth. In some instances, categorization determines 
whether speech receives First Amendment protection at all (political speech does, obscenity 
does not); in other instances, categorization defines the degree of First Amendment protection 
speech warrants (political speech deserves the most stringent protection, commercial speech 
something less). Once the Court undertakes categorization, line-drawing is inevitable. The 
line-drawing problems the Court has faced with commercial speech are no different from those 
encountered in other areas of the First Amendment. See generally Frederick Schauer, Catego-
ries and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 V AND. L. REv. 265 (1981); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Post-liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 293 (1992). 
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unless It IS both aimed directly at potential purchasers and ad-
dresses the characteristics of Nike's products, including the prod-
uct's price, quality, appearance, and safety, but nothing more. 126 
Speech relating to moral and political matters, even if linked to a 
product or aimed at consumers, is not "commercial," Nike main-
tains, because it "affects purchasing choices only secondarily, if at 
all" and is "concerned with moral judgments that only indirectly 
affect consumer behavior," for "only a subset of listeners.,,127 Un-
der Nike's proposed test, Nike's letters to college athletic directors 
and newspaper advertisements defending its labor practices are not 
commercial speech because they focus not on Nike's products, but 
on Nike's corporate conduct. 
It is hard to imagine the Court accepting Nike's redefinition 
of commercial speech. To begin with, the Court has repeatedly 
rejected similar arguments in the past. Anticipating precisely this 
kind of attack, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmac/ 28 
acknowledged that, at times, there might be a convergence of com-
mercial speech and core speech on important social matters, giving 
as examples advertising for legal abortions, promotion of artificial 
furs as an alternative to the extinction of fur-bearing animals, and 
advertisements by domestic producers urging that consumers buy 
their products as an alternative to imports that deprive U.S. resi-
dents of their jobs.129 These communications, the Court made 
clear, were nonetheless to be judged under the commercial speech 
test even though they also addressed important political and social 
matters. 130 The Court repeated this point in Central Hudson, rec-
ognizing that "many, if not most, products may be tied to public 
concerns about the environment, energy, economic policy, or indi-
vidual health and safety" and that a linkage between a product and 
a matter of public debate does not transform commercial speech 
into core speech.131 The Court reiterated this view in Bolger, 
where it addressed the constitutional status of pamphlets distrib-
uted by a condom manufacturer which, along with promoting the 
product, contained a discussion about the value of condoms in 
halting the spread of venereal disease. Finding that the pamphlets 
were commercial rather than core speech, the Court emphasized 
126 Brief for the Petitioners Nike, Inc., et. aI. at 16, Nike (No. 02·575); see also id. at 26·28. 
121 [d. at 19, 36, 46. 
12Jl Va. State Bd. of Phannacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
129 [d. at 764-65. 
130 [d. at 765. 
131 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 n.5 
(1980). 
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that the pamphlets were advertisements, that they referred to a par-
ticular product, and that they were economically motivated, thus 
subjecting them to review under the commercial speech stan-
dard. 132 
While the line drawn by Bolger is hardly seamless, it has 
worked tolerably well for two decades. Indeed, in the twenty years 
between Bolger and Nike, no case before the Court turned on the 
definitional question. The line-drawing test proposed by Nike, 
apart from being novel, would dramatically reshape the landscape 
of commercial speech law on the basis of highly indeterminate and 
subjective judgments. Under Nike's definition, a wide array of 
statements could be characterized as "moral" or "political," even 
though they plainly drive consumer choice. Statements about 
whether food is kosher, whether produce is organic, whether tuna 
is dolphin-safe, and whether cosmetics have been produced with-
out animal testing, could all, under Nike's theory, fall outside the 
definition of commercial speech, even though the government 
regulates such claims for accuracy. 133 So too might statements by 
corporations about matters relating to executive compensation, the 
likelihood that a drug company's product will be approved by the 
FDA, or predictions about the fate of a new prodUCt. 134 Statements 
of this sort, of course, have long been regulated by the SEC and 
the FDA.135 The briefs by Nike's opponents are replete with other, 
equally compelling, examples of claims that could, applying 
Nike's definition, fall outside of the line, notwithstanding the fact 
that they are at the forefront of consumer concerns and are pres-
ently the subject of government regulation. 136 For all of these rea-
sons, it is likely that the Court would see Nike's definitional argu-
ment for what it is-an effort to promote the substantial deregula-
tion of corporate speech. 
132 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983). 
133 See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United States 
Congress at 2, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575). 
134 See Press Release, FDA, FDA and SEC Work to Enhance Public's Protection from 
False and Misleading Statements (Feb. 5, 2004) (announcing cooperative program between the 
FDA and SEC to enable SEC to investigate claims that FDA-regulated firms have made state-
ments material to the firm's financial condition that may be false or misleading), available at 
http://www.fda.govlbbs/topicsINEWS/2004INEWOI 0 19 .html. 
135Id. 
136 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United 
States Congress at 2-3, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575) (discussing consumer concerns relating to 
kosher food, unionized labor, and product testing practices); Brief of Amicus Curiae Public 
Citizen at 22-25, Nike (No. 02-575) (noting consumers' concern for environmentally conscious 
products and "Made in the USA" labeling); Brief of Domini Social Investments LLC et. al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4-5, Nike (No. 02-575) (noting airline maintenance 
and safety as an example). 
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The final, albeit related, problem with Nike's definitional ar-
gument is that it begs the question of the constitutional status of 
"image" advertising. As students of modern advertising point out, 
today's mass media advertising has little to do with "information" 
and almost everything to do with "image.,,137 Image advertising 
focuses not on a corporation's product, but the corporation's iden-
tity, or, more precisely, the identity the corporation wants to pro-
ject to the public. 138 We are told that young people comprise "the 
Pepsi generation," having a Mastercard is "priceless," that "At 
Ford, Quality is Job #1," and that Nike wants us to "Just Do It." 
Nike's advertisements do not communicate information about the 
price, durability, or availability of its products. Rather, they "con-
vey[] the idea that Nike sneakers [a]re worn by people of all ages, 
genders, and disabilities, and that the buyers of Nike shoes ha[ve] 
the grit and determination to take on the type of challenges in-
cluded in the advertisement[] ... 'the roads are always open. Just 
do it.' Wearing Nikes offer[s] a route to spiritual if not political 
salvation .... ,,139 As one expert put it, Nike's advertising suggests 
that buying Nike products is "part of expressing who you are, what 
you stand for and what you believe in."I40 Nike itself said that the 
statements at issue were intended to demonstrate that Nike is "a 
good corporate citizen.,,141 Having carefully cultivated Nike's im-
age as a fair-minded, "good corporate citizen," Nike nonetheless 
argued that statements that go to the heart of that image-whether 
Nike treats its. workers humanely-should be immune from chal-
lenge because they concern moral and not commercial matters. 
Nike's problem here is one of its own making. Having chosen 
image advertising as its preferred way of communicating with con-
sumers, Nike cannot seriously contend that matters that define 
Nike's image are not "commercial" in the most basic sense. 142 On 
this point, Nike's arguments about context undercut its line-
drawing argument as well. If context is important to properly 
137 See Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEx. 
L. REv. 697, 708 (1993) (noting advertisers' concern with image and illusion more than prod-
uct). 
1381d. 
139RANDY SHAW, RECLAIMING AMERICA: NIKE, CLEAN AiR, AND THE NEW NATIONAL 
AcrIVISM 17 (1999). 
140 Steve Suo, Nike Takes Own Advice in Changing Its Slogan, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, 
Jan. 4, 1998, at AI, available at 1998 WL 4171086 (quoting Lynn Khale, head of the marketing 
program at the University of Oregon). 
141 Brief for the Petitioners at (i), Nike (No. 02-575). 
142Nike's own CEO, Phil Knight, admitted as much in 1998, when he acknowledged that 
"I truly believe the American consumer doesn't want to buy products made under abusive con-
ditions." Bill Richards, Nike to Increase Minimum Age in Asia/or New Hirings, Improve Air 
Quality, WALLST.J., May 13, 1998,atBIO. 
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categorizing speech, then it must be understood that Nike' s state-
ments at issue in Nike v. Kasky were not made in the course of a 
debating society discussion over labor practices in Asia. They 
were made because a consumer boycott of Nike products in the 
late 1990s delivered a body blow to Nike's bottom line. Nike lost 
money in 1998 for the first time in thirteen years and had to layoff 
2,000 workers. 143 Nike's statements were made to stop the flood 
of consumer defections by demonstrating that Nike is, in fact, the 
"good corporate citizen" it claims to be. No speech was more cen-
tral to Nike's economic well-being than the statements at issue in 
Nike v. Kasky. 
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the Court will adopt 
Nike's view that only communications directed to consumers that 
make representations about specific products qualify as commer-
cial speech. The consequences of such an approach would be far-
reaching. If one accepts Nike's basic proposition that the com-
mercial speech doctrine applies only to direct-to-consumer ads and 
little else, then one must accept the necessary corollary to Nike's 
argument-that commercial speakers may not be compelled to ac-
count for the accuracy of much of their speech in court or by gov-
ernment regulators, absent the most extraordinary circumstances. 
The Court is unlikely to accept such a significant reformulation of 
the definition of commercial speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Extracting lessons from a case not decided is undoubtedly an 
exercise fraught with uncertainty. There is no way to know 
whether the concerns that drove the Court to accept review in Nike 
will animate the Court in future cases. Nor is it assured that, hav-
ing carefully considered Nike, the Court will be anxious to review 
the next case that presents the same questions. 
But one thing is certain: The commercial speech doctrine re-
mains a controversial doctrine in considerable flux. As one First 
Amendment authority recently remarked, commercial sReech is "a 
notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment 
143 As one report put it: 
Some of the most admired and powerful brand advertising was tainted when . . . 
[Nike] became embroiled in the Asian sweatshop scandal. The brand that could 
seemingly do no wrong was suddenly the target of a violent backlash, particularly on 
the internet, where a Boycott Nike website became the focus of activity. The effects 
of the PR disaster on Nike were dramatic. In 1998 it made losses for the first time in 
13 years and was forced to cut almost 2,000 jobs. 
James Curtis, Public Relations: PR Takes Center Stage, CAMPAIGN, Mar. 10, 2000, available at 
2000 WL 9853049. 
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jurisprudence. No other realm of First Amendment law has proved 
as divisive."l44 For that reason, courts will continue to be pre-
sented with inventive arguments, like those raised by Nike, seek-
ing to broaden First Amendment protection to speech the govern-
ment labels "commercial," and the courts will have to address 
those arguments. 
Without guidance from the Court in Nike, we are left to pre-
dict the direction the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine 
will take. Nike presents the dilemma of a story untold. Like an 
audience permitted to see only the first three acts of a four-act 
play, the audience in Nike was left to imagine its own ending. 
Perhaps it is best that the Court chose not to write Nike's final act. 
After all, the case presented "difficult First Amendment ques-
tions,,,145 the record before the Court was threadbare, the Court had 
little time to deliberate/46 and the Court's dismissal led to the 
quick resolution of the case on terms both parties found accept-
able. 147 
This Article imagines one conclusion to Nike-that the Court 
would have been hesitant to engage in the sort of wholesale revi-
sion of the doctrine Nike urged. The basic truth about the com-
mercial speech doctrine is that it was crafted as a pragmatic solu-
tion to the complicated problem of how to open the door to truthful 
communications between sellers and prospective purchasers while 
continuing to shield prospective purchasers from falsehoods and 
half-truths that distort the market. The test that has evolved to 
evaluate restraints on commercial speech, the modern Central 
Hudson test, has not served that goal perfectly, but has served it 
reasonably well-so much so that the doctrine is criticized far 
more for its theoretical failings than for the results it produces. 
While the doctrine may be "notoriously unstable and contentious," 
the results it produces are generally predictable and broadly ap-
144 Post, supra note 89, at 2. 
145 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2558 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2560 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
146 The timing of Nike might have been a problem for the Court. The Court granted Nike's 
petition for a writ of certiorari on January 10,2003. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003). 
Nike was argued just three months later on April 23, 2003, the final argument day of the 2002 
Term, and was dismissed on June 26, 2003, the final day the Court issued opinions from the 
2002 Term. Thus, had the Court reached the merits, it would have had just two months from the 
date of argument to consider and decide the case, leaving little time for the circulation of draft 
opinions and deliberation within the Court. 
141 David F. Pike, Activist Lawyer Questions Nike Pact on Labor: Letters by Attorney De-
mand Whole Story, Details of Settlement, L.A. DAILY 1., Nov. 26, 2003, at I (quoting Kasky's 
lawyer as saying that "Mr. Kasky is satisfied that this settlement reflects Nike's commitment to 
positive change where factory workers are concerned," and Nike's director for global issues 
management as saying that the settlement "benefits a wide array of people"). 
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proved. Aside from the Court's acknowledged mistake in Posa-
das, few of the Court's commercial speech decisions have drawn 
fire because of their results. For this reason, although the Court 
will continue to tinker with the commercial speech doctrine at the 
margins, it is not likely to abandon the doctrine's central value of 
encouraging the free flow of truthful-and only truthful-
commercial information to consumers to enable informed decision-
making. 
Postscript-A Brief Response to Collins and Skover 
In an effort to sort out the authors' positions on the key ques-
tions raised by Nike v. Kasky, Collins and Skover present four hy-
pothetical cases and then speculate how each author might resolve 
them. 148 Because Collins and Skover's speculation about how I 
would analyze the cases is only partly correct, I want to set the 
record straight. 
As Collins and Skover predict, for me, the final two of the 
case illustrations are easy because they build on the facts of Nike v. 
Kasky but add important context that further undermines Nike's 
First Amendment defense. In one case, Nike makes specific repre-
sentations about the working conditions in foreign factories at a 
shareholders' meeting; in the other, Nike makes the same represen-
tations to an assembly of college athletic coaches who have "in-
formed Nike that they would no longer purchase its products ab-
sent clear assurances that the workers were neither underpaid nor 
physically abused." In my view, a First Amendment defense by 
Nike would fail. Nike recognized that, even if the Court reshaped 
the commercial speech doctrine along the lines it urged, the First 
Amendment would not shield a company from liability for making 
false claims about a company's product directly to consumers. 
After all, Nike's plea to the U.S. Supreme Court was that the Court 
should fashion a commercial speech test that was affirmatively 
context-specific. 149 In one hypothetical, Nike is making inaccurate 
claims to appease angry customers; in the other, it is making inac-
curate claims to influence investors. And in both cases, Nike's 
concessions about context would be its undoing. 150 
148 Ronald L.K. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword, The Landmark Free-Speech Case 
that Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965, 1031-39 & nn.299-301 
(2004). 
149 Brief of the Petitioners at 22-26, Nike (No. 02-575). 
ISO [d. at 34 n.9 (conceding that under the securities laws, and other "special regulatory re-
gime[s]," strict regulation of corporate speech would not run afoul of the First Amendment). 
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As to the other two examples, Collins and Skover are only 
half right about my views. In one hypothetical, Nike joins a vio-
lence-against-women campaign and some unspecified time thereaf-
ter is charged by an "anti-corporate activist group" of "knowingly 
tolerat[ing] abuses against women in its foreign factories." In the 
second case, Phil Knight, Nike's CEO, goes on a popular televi-
sion show and says that Nike "is committed to being Green." 
Some time later (again unspecified), an investigative reporter re-
veals that a Nike plant in Taiwan has polluted the local water sup-
ply. Collins and Skover speculate that I would find the "'being 
Green' scenario a candidate for free speech protection, if only be-
cause Phil Knight's statement is arguably not specific enough to 
trigger any real consumer reliance." 151 I agree that the "being 
Green" scenario would not present Nike opponents with a viable 
lawsuit. But I base that conclusion not just on the lack of specific-
ity in Phil Knight's comments, but also because this hypothetical, 
like the violence-against-women hypothetical, lacks the rich con-
text that made Nike v. Kasky, and the two hypothetical cases build-
ing on Nike v. Kasky, not just viable, but winnable, cases. 
The problem with these two hypothetical cases is that there is 
no clear connection between the company's statements and the 
misdeeds the company is accused of committing. In this respect, 
these hypothetical cases depart markedly from the real Nike v. 
Kasky, which arose because activists threw down the gauntlet to 
Nike on the company's foreign labor practices and Nike picked it 
up. There was no question in Nike that the company's statements 
about its labor practices were made in direct response to the 
charges that had been laid against the company.152 Had Collins 
and Skover wanted their examples to parallel Nike v. Kasky, the 
company's statements in support of environmental protection and 
safeguarding the rights of female workers would have been made 
in response to, not before, allegations of misconduct. Here is 
where I draw the line. As a litigator, I would take neither the "be-
ing Green" nor the "violence-against-women" case, based on the 
skeletal facts we have been given, because proving that the state-
ments were not accurate when made would be too hard, if not im-
possible. Thus, in both cases, I think that the company might have 
a solid First Amendment defense based on truth. The "violence-
against-women" case is problematic for another reason: Nike's 
statement is not clearly a statement of its own practices, in stark 
151 Collins & Skover, supra note 148, at 1037. 
152 See, e.g., Brief of the Petitioners at 40-42, Nike (No. 02-575); Brief for the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Nike (No. 02-575). 
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contrast to Nike's actual statements about how it treated its foreign 
workers. And the "being Green" scenario is a difficult one to liti-
gate because saying that a company is "committed to being Green" 
(not that the company is Green) may be more a statement of aspi-
ration than one of fact, and may not be actionable for that reason 
as well. Thus, I think that the First Amendment is stronger medi-
cine than perhaps Collins and Skover recognize, not because it 
protects falsehoods, but because these hypothetical cases do not 
involve the kind of clear-cut misstatements of fact at issue in Nike 
v. Kasky. 
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